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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RAYMOND STEW ART, 
Plaintiff and Resp<mdent, 
-vs-
JOHN L. SULLIVAN and 
RICHARD lVIONK ALLEN 
' 
Defendants and A ppella.nts. 
Case No. 
12958 
Respondent's Brief on Appeal 
STATEJ\1ENT OV' THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries arising out 
of an automobile accident. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COUR'l' 
The action was dismissed by the District Court be-
cause of the failure of plaintiff's former counsel to 
answer interrogatories. The Order of May 25, 1972, 
from which defendants appeal, provides that the dis-
missal is to be "without prejudice". After the dismissal, 
plaintiff filed a new action against defendants in the 
District Court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to affirm the Order of Dismissal ' 
without prejudice so that he might proceed with his 
action against the defendants. 
STATE~MENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was seriously injured in an automobile 
accident which occurred on November 22, 1968. The de-
tails of the accident and injuries may be found in a , 
comprehensive case evaluation which is part of an affi-
davit of plaintiff's counsel (R-72). There is no oppos-
ing affidavit, and for purpo:'les of this appeal, it can 
be assumed that both defendants are guilty of either 
negligence or willful misconduct, and that the injuries 
to plaintiff were extreme and disabling (special dam- ' 
ages and loss of wages alone totaling some $121,581.72). 
Plaintiff has never had his day in court, the case 
having been dismissed for failure on the part of his 
counsel to answer interrogatories. The sole question on 
appeal is whether the dismissal was with or without 
prejudice. 
Plaintiff's counsel at the time of fili11g the action 
herein was J. Lambert Gibson. :Mr. Gibson represented 
the plaintiff throughout the early stages of the pro-
ceeding. After a notice of readiness for trial had ~een 
filed the defendant served l\Ir. Gibson with wntten 
' . 
interrogatories. l\Ir. Gibson failed to answer the mter-
rogatories and failed to notify his client about them. 
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After several attempts were made by defendants to 
get the answers, the matter was noticed for hearing and 
eventually on April 2, 1971, Judge Stewart 1\1. Han-
son dismissed plaintiff's complaint (R-50). Mr. Gib-
son did not appear at the hearing. The order did not 
specify whether it was to be with or without prejudice. 
In September of 1971, plaintiff contacted a new 
attorney, Neil D. Schaerrer, and advised him that he 
could not get l\fr. Gibson to explain the status of the · 
case; he also requested .Mr. Schaerrer at that time to 
take over the case (R-67). After some difficn1ty, the 
plaintiff was able to locate l\Ir. Gibson to obtain the 
file, at which time Mr. Gibson informed him that the 
case had been dismissed without prejudice (R-fi8). Up 
to that time, the plaintiff was completely unaware of 
any dismissal ( R-95). After obtaining l\Jr. Gibson's 
file, :Mr. Schaerrer telephoned David K. l\Tin<ler and 
was advised that lHr. Winder represented defendant Al-
len and State Farm l\f utual Insurance Company 
( R-68). l\fr. '1\Tinder told l\Ir. Schaerrer that he had 
prepared the order of dismissal and that the case had 
been dismissed without prejudice; Mr. \Vinder sug-
gested that an attempt he made to settle the case and 
suggested that Mr. Schaerrer prepare and provide for 
him a detailed case evaluation supplying among other 
things the information requested in the interrogatories 
which l\1r. Gibson had failed to furnish (R-68). Mr. 
Winder also told :Mr. Schaerrer that after the dismissal 
had been signed, he discussed the matter with l\Ir. Gib-
son and told l\Ir. Gibson of the court's ruling and that 
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l\Jr. Gibson ad,Tised him that he was heavily involved 
in the legislature and had been unable to answer the in-
terrogatories and that he would furnish the answers to 
interrogatories to l\lr. 'Vinder at a later date (R-69). 
l\Ir. 'Vinder also told l\1r. Gibson that there was no 
problem about the dismissal because the action could 
always be refiled within a year and that the Statute of 
Limitations had not run anyway (R-85). It might be 
noted at this point that l\'lr. lVinder at pages 8 through 
10 of appellant Allen's brief admits that at the time, he 
thought the dismissal was without prejudice, but now 
concludes on page 10 he was erroneous in interpreting 
the legal effect of the document which he himself pre-
pared and that l\Ir. Gibson could have done his own re-
search, and that he owed no fiduciary duty to Gibson. 
After the conversation with l\Ir. 'V'inder, Mr. 
Schaerrer went to work obtaining the voluminous medi-
cal, hospital and other records and information neces-
sary to prepare the case evaluation, which required some 
considerable time ( R-G9). Afte1· the case evaluation had 
been prepared, l\1r. Schaerrer presented copies to coun-
sel for both of the defendants. At that time, he was 
utlvised for the first time hy l\lr. Schoenhals, counsel 
for defendant Sullivan and USF&G Insurance Com-
pany, that the dismissal was with prejudice (R-~O_} since 
under Rule 41 ( b) of the Utah Rules of C1v1l Pro-
cedure, a dismissal for failure to answer interrogatories 
would operate as a matter of law as an adjudication upon 
the merits unless the court otherwise specifies. Mr. 
SchaeiTer later discussed the matter with Judge Han-
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son who told him it was intended that the order be with-
out prejudice (R-71); Judge Hanson directed Mr. 
~chaerrer to prepare an order for his signature coITect-
mg the error so as to properly reflect the wav the order 
should have been entered (R-71). Such an. order was 
prepared and entered on March 16, 1972, ( R-55). 
Pollowing the entry of the Amended Order of Dis-
missal on :March 16, 1972, hoth of the defendants made 
motions to set aside the Amended Order and to deter-
mine that the original dismissal was with prejudice. At 
the same time, the plaintiff moved that the court grant 
relief from the original judgment on additional grounds 
under Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
which provides for relief from a judgment or order for 
any reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. These motions were heard on April 13, 1972, 
and defendants convinced Judge Hanson that he had no 
power to grant relief from the original judgment; ac-
cordingly, he set aside the Amended Order of Dismissal 
and denied plaintiff's Motion to Amend on additional 
grounds (R-84, 97). 
After the hearing on April 13, 1972, and after 
J uclge Hanson had announced his ruling, but before 
the preparation and entry of the actual order on :May 
3, 1972, plaintiff learned that J. Lambert Gibson had 
been suspended by the Utah State Bar Commission from 
the practice of law on the 14th of l\fay, 1971, (R-93}' 
that the client was never aware of the suspension (R-
95), and that 1\-lr. Gibson could not have taken any im-
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mediate action after the entry of the original order of 
dismissal to protect his client's interest. Plaintiff, there-
fore, made a motion to receive further affidavits and 
hear further arguments before makillg entry of the 
April 13th ruling (R-88). This matter was noticed for 
hearing on l\Iay 16; however, defendants prepared and 
caused to lrnve signed and entered Judge 1-lanson's rul-
ing of April 13; this was done on l\Iay 3, 1972 (R-97). 
When the matter was again heard before Judge 
Hanson on .l\Iay lo, 1972, after the additional affidavits 
had been filed, the Juclge correctly concluded that his 
prior ruling of April la (Order entered on l\fay 3, 
1972) was erroneous; that a substantial injustice would 
he done if that niling were allowed to stand; and that 
he did in fact have the m1thority under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure to grant relief to the plaintiff from 
the original juclgme11t of dismissal in April of 1971. 
Accordi1wl'' Judge Hanson set aside his Order of :May ~ ·'' 
3, 1972, and ruled that the original dismissal of plain-
tiff's complaint was to be "without prejudice." (R. 102) 
It is this order that plaintiff seeks to have affirmed on 
appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
PLAINTIFF RELlEF UNDER RULE 60(b) (7) 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE. 
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure · 
provides as follows: 
"On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal represent-
ative from a final judgment, order or proceed-
ing for the following reasons: (I) mistake, in-
advertence, surprise or excusable neglect; ( 2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due dili-
gence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud (whether heretofore denominated in-
trinsic), misrepresentation, or other miscon-
duct of an adverse party; ( 4) when, for any 
cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as re-
quired by Rule 4 ( e) and the defendan~ has 
failed to appear in said action; ( 5) the Judg-
ment is void; ( 6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is bas~d !ms been re-
versed or otherwise vacated, or It IS no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (7) any other 
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reas~n justifying relief from the operation of 
the Judgment. The motion shall be made within 
a reasonable time and for reasons ( 1) , ( 2) , 
~ 3) , ( 4) , not more than 3 months after the 
Judgment, order, or proceeding was entered 
or taken." 
Since the motion of plaintiff's ne\\' counsel was made 
more than three ( 3) months from the date of the first 
order of dismissal, plaintiff must come within Subsec-
tion (7) which allows relief for "any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 
It is plaintiff's position that the facts here clearly jus-
tify relief under this subsection. 
Rule 60 (h) (7) has heen construed by the Utah 
Supreme Court on several occasions. One of the lead-
ing cases wherein the Con rt invoked Subsection ( 7) 
of the rule is J)i,ron -v.~- Di,1·on, 121 Utah 250, 240 P.2d 
1211. In that case, the Court held that a formal order 
signed and entered upon the erroneous assumption that 
it conformed to a direction of the Court is more than 
a mere inaclYertence and can he set riside more than 
three ( 3) months after its entry. The Court in noting 
that it would work a "grave injustice to permit the 
order to stand" also notc<l that e\·en in the absence of 
Rule 60 ( h) ( 7). the Court would lun-e inherent power 
to set aside the formal order. This case is somewhat sim· 
ilar to the instant case in that here the parties, including 
plaintiff's counsel, defendants' counsel and the .District 
Judge, were au· under the erroneous assumpbo~ t~at 
the original Order of Dismissal was without prejudice. 
j 
I 
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Another case in point is Nev -vs- Harrison, 5 Utah 
2d 217, 2!)9 P.2d lll4 where the Court set aside a de-
fault judgment some eleven ( ll) months after the date 
of judgment. The only ground stated was that de-
fendant was under the mistaken belief that she was 
fully protected under a Divorce Decree ordering her 
ex-husband to pay certain obligations. The Court con-
cluded that Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) was intended to govern this 
type of situation, and pointed out the strong policy of 
the Jaw to liberally construe the statutes and rules of 
procedure in favor of trial on the merits. The Court 
also recognized the latitude of discretion given the trial 
court in such matters and stated as follows: 
"The Utah decisions relied upon by plain-
tiff recognize the firmly established principle 
that it is largely within the discretion of the 
trial court whether a default should he relieved, 
which discretion will not be disturbed unless 
there is a patent abuse thereof." 
The N elf -vs- Harrison case is on all fours. with t11e in-
staut case, as here we have a mistaken belief as to the 
effect of an order, plus the exercise of discretion on 
the part of the trial court in plaintiff's favor. 
· A case not involvin(J" Subsection ( 7) of Rule 60 (b) 
b • 
hut which strongly sets forth the policy of the law m 
granting relief from defaults is JJI ayhcw -vs- Standm·d 
Gil.wnite Company, 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951. In 
that case, the Supreme Court found an abuse of discre-
. f f ·1· to grant tion and re\'ersed the trial court or a1 mg 
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relief. In speaking for a unanimous court, Justice 
Crockett wrote as follows : 
"It is unclouhtedly correct that the trial 
court is endowed with considemble latitude of 
discretion in granting or denying such motions. 
However, it is also true that the court cannot 
act arbitrarily in that regard, but should be 
?'ene~·ally indulgent toward permitting full 
mqmry and know ledge of disputes so they can 
be settled advisedly and in conformity with 
law and justice. To clamp a judgment rigidly 
and irrevocably on a party without a hearing 
is obviously a harsh and oppressive thing. It is 
f unclamental in our system of justice that each 
party to a conh'oversy should be afforded an 
opportunity to present his side of the case. For 
that reason, it is quite uniformly regarded as 
an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a 
default judgment where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's 
failure to appear, and timely application is 
made to set it aside." 
Utah cases cited hy the appellant· do not support 
their position hut, in fact, support the position of the 
respondent. 1-Varrcn ·l'S· Di,ron Ranch Cornpany, 128 
Utah 416, 260 P.2d 74'1, upon which both defendants 
rely, involves a situation where the court refused to set 
aside a default judgment. The case simply stands for 
the proposition that the Supreme Court will not re;erse 
a decision of the trial court unless an abuse of discre-
tion is clearly shown. Although in this case (which in-
yo}ved an entirely different fact situation) the Su-
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preme Court. refused to substitute its judgment for 
that of the tnal court. The court commented that 
' 
"Discretion must he exercised in further-
ance of justice and the court will incline to-
ward granting relief in a doubtful case to the 
end that a party may have a hearing." 
As to the matter of discretion, the court also stated as 
follows: 
":'he allowance of a vacation of judg~ 
ment is a creature of equity designed to relieve 
against harshness of enforcing a judgment, 
which may occur through procedural dif ficul-
ties, the wrongs of the opposing party, or mis-
fortunes which prevent the presentation of a 
claim or defense.*** Equity considers factors 
which may be inelevant in actions at law, such 
as the * * * hardship in granting or denying 
relief. Although an equity court no longer has 
complete discretion in granting or denying re-
lief it may exercise wide judicial discretion in 
weighing the factors of fairness and public 
convenience, and this court on appeal will re-
verse the trial court only where an abuse of' this 
discretion is clearly shown." 
I, 
I 
In· the case of Board of Education of Granite School 
District -vs- Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806, the 
trial court set aside a default judgment entered against 
one defendant, but refused to set aside the default of 
another defendant because the court did not believe 
the defendant's excuse and believed the def~~~ ~as 
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deliberate; again, the Supreme Court refused to inter-
fere with the discretion of the trial judge. In the case 
of Shaw -v.~- Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 P.2d 949, the 
court held that the plaintiff could maintain an inde-
pendent action to set aside a Decree of Adoption on the 
grounds of fraud upon the court even though seventeen 
( 17) months had elapsed since the entry of the decree 
and even though under Rule GO (b) ( 3), a motion for 
relief based upon fraud must be filed within three (3) 
months. 
Rule 60 ( b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
is patterned after Rule HO ( b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Subsection (7) of the Utah rule is 
identical to Subsection ( 6) of the Federal rule, which 
provides relief for " ( 6) any other reason justifying re-
lief from the operation of the judgment." Under the 
Federal rule, motions under Subsections ( 1) , ( 2) and 
( 3) can be made within one year which differs from 
the three months limitation under the Utah rule. There 
are numerous federal cases interpreting Rule 60 ( b) ( 6) 
of the Fecleral Rules. l\Iany of these cases may be of 
help to the court here. 
The u11clerlying principle of Federal Ru 1 e 
60 ( b) ( ()) is explained by Justice Black in the leading 
case of Klapprott -v.~- U11itcd State.~, 335 U.S. 601, 69 
S.Ct. 384, 93 L.E<l. 266 wherein the plaintiff was 
granted relief from a default judgment of denaturaliza-
tion after the judgment had been entered for four years. 
There it was stated, 
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, "In sim~le English, the language of the 
othe~ reaso~ clause, for all reasons except 
the five particularly specified, vests power in 
courts adequate to enable them to vacate judg-
ments ~hen~ver. such action is appropriate to 
accomplish Justice." 
In interpreting the Klapprott and other federal cases 
Moore in his work on Federal Practice at Sect.io~ 
60.27(2) sums up the effect of Subsection (6) as fol-. 
lows: 
~·Seen in perspective, clause ( 6) is clearly 
a residual clause to cover unforeseen contin-
gencies; intended to be a means for accom-
plishing justice in, what may be termed 
generally, exceptional situations; and so con-
fined, does not put the finality of judgments 
generally at large." 
.Moore also points out that in most cases, litigation is 
handled by lawyers and whatever negligence is involved 
in the losing of cases is theirs, not the personal negli-
gence of their clients. It is pointed out that the federal 
decisions have shown considerable sympathy in invok-
ing Rule 60 ( h) ( 6) in favor of an innocent litigant who 
has had an incompetent or a sloppy lawyer. l\fany courts 
have held that gross negligence of a lawyer is sufficient 
to afford relief under Rule 60 ( b) ( 6). See Barber ·VS· 
Turberville, 215 }?.2d 34; Lucas ·t'S· City of Juneau, 
(D. Alaska) 20 F.R.D. 407; In Re: Estate of Cremida..'1 
(D. Alaska) 14 F.R.D. 15 where attack on judgment 
came some three years after it was entered. 
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. .t~ leading case is L. I'. Steuart, Inc. -vs- lllatther.tw,. 
329 I• .2d 234 where plaintiff's case was dismissed for 
failure to prosecute due to negligence of counsel. Two 
years later, through different counsel, plaintiff filed a 
motion to vacate the judgment. The District Court de-
nied the motion and on appeal, the Court of Appeal.., 
held that the District Court had abused its discretion 
in denying relief under Rule ()0 (b) ( 6). The court 
wrote: 
"Clause ( 6) is broad enough to pennit 
relief when as in this case personal problems 
of counsel cause him grossly to neglect a 
client's case and mislead the client." 
Other cases following the Steuart decision and granting 
relief for neglect of counsel are King -v.Y- lllordowanec 
( D. R. I.) 4() F .R.D. 47 4 (motion filed one year and 
nine months after entry of judgment); Transport Pool 
Dit"ision of Container Leasing, Inc. -vs- Joe Jone.~ 
Truclt·ing Company, (N.D. Ga.) 319 F.Supp. 1308. 
Under the federal cases, there is no question but what 
plaintiff is entitled to the relief he seeks. It would seem 
that the Utah rule ought to be construed more, and not 
less, liberal than the federal rule because our limitation 
period for coming under the other subsections of the 
rule is much shorter. 
It would seem that under the federal interpreta-
tions that gross negligence of counsel alone is sufficient 
to grant relief. Under the Utah decisions, a mistaken 
belief as to the effect of an order is sufficient to grant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
relief. Plaintiff here qualifies under both reasons. How-
ever, there are even additional reasons in this case to 
justify the invoking of Rule 60(b) (7). 
l\fr. Gibson in his affidavit alleges that he relied 
upon statements made by l\Ir. Winder in not taking 
prompt action to obtain relief from the order (R-86). 
Thus, the element of estoppel comes into existence as 
counsel for both defendants seem to acknowledge that 
there would have been no problem in setting the order 
aside had the motion been made within three months. In 
Rice -vs- Granite School District, 28 Utah 2d 22, 456 
P.2d 159, this court said, 
"YVhere the delay in commencing an action 
is induced bv the conduct of the defendant, or 
his privies, ~r an insurance adjuster acting in 
his behalf, it cannot be availed of by any of 
them as a defense. 
One cannot justly or equitably lull an ad-
versarv into a false sense of security, thereby 
subje~ting his claim to the bar of limitations, 
and then be heard to plead that very delay 
as a defense to the action when brought. Acts 
or conduct which wrongfully induce a party 
to believe an amicable adjustment of his claim 
will be made may create an estoppel against 
pleading the Statute of Limitations." 
In this case, the delay in taking action to seek reli~f 
from the judgment was thus attributable to defendants 
own conduct. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
. In summing up the reasons why plaintiff is en-. 
bt~e~ to relief, we fincl all of the following elements 
ex1stmg: 
I. Gross negligence on the part of plaintiff's 
counsel in failing to answer interrogatories 
after having been given many opportuni-
ties to <lo so. 
2. A bona fide mistaken belief on the part of 
aJl parties as to the legal effect of the order 
of dismissal. 
8. Estoppcl resulting from relinnce upon 
statements made by defendant's counsel. 
4. Extreme, severe and totally disabling in-
juries to plaintiff and clear liability against 
the <lef endants. 
5. Complete innocence on the part of plain-
tiff himself. 
6. No claimed prejudice on the part of either 
defendant resulting from the delay. 
7. Policy of law to liberally constme the rules 
of procedure in favor of deciding cases on 
the merits. 
8. Liability insurance coverage by both defen-
dants and the policy of law to provide pro-
tection to accident victims and not allow 
dismissals for unprejudicial technicalities. 
9. Ruling of the trial court in favor of the 
plaintiff. 
If there were ever a case where Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) 
ought and should be properly invoked, it is this case. 
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POINT II 
THE RELIEF GRAN'l'ED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT IS ALSO PROPER UNDER RULE 
60(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE. 
An additional ground for supporting the order of 
the District Court is Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure which provides for the correction of · 
clerical errors. 
In the Order of March 16, 1972, (R-55) Judge 
llanson recites on his own motion that a clerical error 
was made and that the order should have been prepared 
"without prejudice as directed by the court." Affi-
davits were then filed by defendants' counsel to rebutt 
the recital in the order . .1\Ir. Schoenhals states that the 
court simply granted a motion without comment ( R-
80) ; and l\Ir. \Vinder states he cannot remember exactly 
what was said, but would have prepared the order ac-
cordingly if the court had specifically directed that it 
be without prejudice ( R-60). They thereupon rely upon 
the cnse of Richards ·tw- SiddowaJJ, 24 Utah 2d 314, 
471 P.2d 143 which seems to hold that unless the court 
actually makes a spe~ific pronouncement, any error, re-
gardless of intent, would be judicial error rather than 
a clerical error and not subject to correction under Rule 
60 (a). 
It would seem that the recital of the District Judge 
in a formal order as to what was pronounced, ought to 
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prevail over the rather inconclusive affidavits of coun-
sel. This type of error, that is, the mode of disposition. 
of an action, is generally held to be subject to correc-
tion ~s a clerical error. See 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgements, 
Sect10n 204. 
POINT III 
TIIERE \VAS XO ERROR IN THE TRIAL 
JUDGE RECONSIDERING AND CHANGING 
HIS RULING, AND THIS POINT IS NOT A 
BON i\ FIDE ISSUE ON .APPE1\ L. 
'Vhen Judge IIanson first heard the arguments of 
defendants, he was apparently convinced that he could 
not legally amend the original Order of Dismissal and, 
therefore, ruled that it must stand as entered, the legal 
effect of which would be to deprive plaintiff of his 
day in court. Plaintiff, after discovering other informa-
tion and filing additional affidavits, moved that this 
ruling he reconsidered and after further hearing, Judge 
Hanson recognized that the prior ruling was wrong. 
Both defendants now claim that under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the District Judge is powerless to 
correct an error of law. even though the motion for 
reconsideration was made within ten (IO) days as pro-
vided bv Rule 50, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff would submit that this is not a bona fide issue 
on appeal, because if Judge Hanson had not reconsid-
ered and changed his ruling, his erroneous order would 
have constituted an abuse of discretion under the cases 
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cited in Point I herein, from which plaintiff would have 
appealed; if such had been the case, the appellate court 
would still have been faced with the identical basic issue 
on appeal, and under the extraordinary facts of this 
case, plaintiff would, in that event, have been entitled to 
a reversal. 
The only case relied upon by defendants is Utah 
State Employees Credit Union -vs- Riding, 24 Utah 2d · 
211, 469 P.2d I. In that case, the court did make a dicta 
statement that it was unaware of a motion under our 
rules for reconsideration of a judgment. The court went 
on, however, to decide the case on entirely different 
grounds and expressly assumed in the opinion that such 
a motion could be entertained. There was no discussion 
in the Riding case as to the applicability of Rule 59 or 
Rule 60, nor was there any reason to discuss them, as 
the case was decided on other grounds. Rule 59 ( e) 
specifically gives the court power to "alter or amend 
the judgment." 
It must be conceded that under some circumstances, 
it would be improper for a trial judge to entertain a 
motion to reconsider his ruling. Such was the case in 
Drury -vs- Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, 
wherein it was held that the trial court after once con-
sidering and granting to a litigant a new trial, could not 
later vacate the new trial. It is important to note that 
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the Drury case was decided in favor of preventing an· 
injustice and giving all of the parties the right to a new 
trial on the merits where errors had been claimed. The 
court also stated as follows: 
"It should he ohserved that what we have 
said herein is intended to apply to the fact sit-
uation shown in the instant case where, pur-
suant to regular procedure, the court has acted 
deliberately and advisedly in granting the new 
trial. However, we also recognize that there 
may be situations where an order denying or 
granting a new trial may have been made by 
inadvertence or mistake, or where there was 
some irregularity in connection with the obtain-
ing or the granting of the order, in which in-
stance, the court could, of course, act to correct 
any such mistake or irregularity." 
At the end of the above quotation, the court made ref-
erence by footnote to Rule 60, which is the same rule 
upon which plaintiff in this case relies: The real issue 
in this case is whether Rule 60 could be properly in-
voked to g-rant plaintiff relief. These issues are fully 
covered under Points I and II of this brief. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities 
as cited herein, plaintiff respectfully requests the court 
to affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS, 
WEST & SCHAERRER 
David E. West 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Atto1'neya for Respondent 
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